The False Choice of Founder Mode

The central premise of Paul Graham’s recent essay on the idea of a “founder mode” rests on a questionable dichotomy between "founder mode" and "manager mode." It assumes these are two distinct and largely incompatible operating models. In reality, the most effective leaders - both founders and hired executives - usually employ a mix of both approaches, tailored to their company's stage and needs.

Firstly, the definition of Founder Mode is pretty incoherent and not well explained. It's basically whatever people decide to input into it, and frankly it sounds like an opaque excuse for why founders who have not had success failed. It's important to remember 95% of founders fail.

I am sympathetic to overreliance on middle managers. Flatter organizations do operate more effectively and efficiency. Paul Graham's take is oversimplified and self-promotional, since his approach is to run his business on the idea that the founder is always right and his deal flow is dependent on marketing himself that way.

No surprise, every founder and wannabe founder on X has decided they're all operating in this imagined idea of Founder Mode. It seems like they're all telling on themselves, since they wouldn't need to go into this supposed "Founder Mode" if they weren't already operating their business effectively.

Successful founders need to delegate and build scalable processes as their companies grow. And the best professional managers still sweat the details and dive deep when needed. Portraying this as an either/or choice creates a false distinction.

The essay relies heavily on anecdotes from a few founders in the author's network. While their experiences are valid, extrapolating from this to make sweeping claims about how all companies should be run is tenuous.

Before accepting the "founder mode" concept, we would need to see hard data showing that companies employing these practices consistently outperform those using conventional management approaches. A few cherry-picked examples don't constitute convincing evidence.

Even if we accept that some iconic founder-led companies have been very successful, it's a leap to attribute that success to their unorthodox management practices. There are many confounding variables at play.

For instance, companies like Apple and Airbnb have had visionary products, strong network effects, and excellent timing. It's entirely possible they succeeded in spite of some of their idiosyncratic practices, not because of them. We should be careful about confusing correlation and causation here.

While the essay is correct that excessive detachment can lead to problems, the proposed alternative of unchecked founder meddling has major risks too. Founders who can't step back and empower their teams create bottlenecks, stifle the development of other leaders, and often make poor decisions due to hubris or blind spots.

The goal should be finding the right balance for each company, not giving founders carte blanche to ignore best practices. Even the most brilliant need formal accountability.

The core issue highlighted by the essay - that founders often feel constrained and frustrated by conventional management wisdom - is real and important. Entrepreneurial companies do need to preserve agility and scrappiness as they scale.

But the concept of "founder mode" as laid out here is more of a provocative thought experiment than a robust alternative paradigm. Before enshrining it, we need much more evidence that ignoring well-established best practices is optimal for company performance.

The likely reality is that building an enduring organization requires a judicious blend of startup-like intensity and more systematic professional management. Figuring out that formula is one of the great challenges of leadership.